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I.

Introduction
This paper presents some preliminary ideas and data on the role of finan

cial intermediation in postwar economic growth in Japan.

The approach here

is essentially empirical: to present past aggregate flows and to determine,
or at least to hypothesize about, some of the important behavioral and in
stitutional relationships of the Japanese financial system.

My presumption

is that Japanese financial intermediaries have in fact participated impor
tantly in attracting savings, in facilitating private business fixed
investment, and in allocating among alternative investment uses.
There are two general approaches to the appraisal of a financial
system: micro.analysis of individual financial institution units, ex
tending to homogeneous groups of financial institutions (such as the
theory of commercial bank behavior, and of the banking system); and macro
analysis of the system as a whole.

To understand the relationship be:

tween real and financial variables for the process of economic growth
both methods are desirable; research should proceed interactingly at both
macro and micro levels, each moving toward the other.

The approach here

*Presented at the Tokyo Center for Economic Research, Seventh Zeshi
Conference, Zushi, Japan, January 1969; revised July 1969, to be published ,:,r- Japanese) in the forthcoming volume on the Con£erence proceedings~
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is essentially aggregative--an appraisal of the entire financial system-
though to some e~tent various categories of financial institutions and
financial instruments are treated.

II.

Alternative Sources for Financing Investment
We must admit frankly that our theoretical tools for empirical analysis

of the dynamic process of economic growth in real world economies are still
When we consider the implications of external economies and diseco

weak.

nomies, input-output relationships, public goods, and of not-well-specified
possibilities of technological change, it becomes more difficult to deter
mine in much detail what constitute efficient or inefficient investment
allocations for growth, and to appraise the efficacy of actual allocations
in a given historical experience of a country's growth.
sorts of broad conclusions can emerge.

Nonetheless, some

These difficulties are magnified

when the relationship between finance and growth is analyzed; here too
our theoretical tools for empirical application are still weak, despite
recent advances in the theory of portfolio selection by Tobin and others,
and in the theory of financial structures by Gurley and Shaw, and Gold
smith.

That literature, and the emphasis here as well, focuses on the

impact of finance on saving and investment, excluding other possible im
pacts on growth-causing forces.
The first step in evaluating the role of financial intermediation is
to appraise how important it actually is relative to the alternative
means of financing investment.

The various mechanisms include: private
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self-finance from saving; government taxation and saving to finance govern
ment or private investment; the market-oriented financial technique of
assets and debts based on, and encouraging, the separation of saving (and
wealth) and investment (and the management of wealth); and reliance on
foreign sources.

Each device has its own merits and defects; frequently

all are used simultaneously, intermingling real and financial assets and
claims; empirically it is difficult to determine social trade-offs among
them.
Self-finance without supplement by external borrowing or lending is
inefficient: it unduly restricts the investment of efficient entrepreneurs;
the pattern of investment is almost certainly less than optimal; the in
centive to save for the wide range of savers with limited investment op
portunities is reduced, outweighing probably the increased saving incen
tive for those who want to invest more.

Saving through government taxation

(or de facto taxation by inflation), because of its involuntary, non
market nature, may have political limits in a democratic society, as well
as disincentive effects on private saving.

Foreign borrowing can be an

important supplementary source, particularly for an economy suffering a
balance of payments constraint on growth, but may also have high political
costs.

The financial intermediation mechanism may have defects too:

markets may be imperfect; financiers may be unduly conservative, willing
to take less risk than socially desirable, or allocating to socially non
optimal projects.
Any spending unit (defined as a purchaser of real goods and services)
can have four activities: saver, investor, lender, borrower.

On a gross
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basis spending units frequently engage in all four.

On a net basis, how

ever, they are only net savers or net investors, i.e., surplus or deficit
spending units.

The net lending-borrowing activity, while in one sense a

mirror image of the net saving-investing activity, is not that alone because
spending units usually have independent reasons for wanting financial flows
as well as real flows--i,e., to increase financial assets as well as real
capital.
In macro-analysis we face the dilemma between the need to aggregate
and the loss of information as inter-unit transactions cancel out in the
process of consolidation.
theory and practice.

This has been a problem for finance both in

Frequently macro-analysis at the most aggregative

level forgets finance altogether, simply equating ex post (and sometimes
~

ante) saving and investment, ignoring the alchemy by which the one is

transmuted into the other.

This difficulty can be met in part by combina

tion rather than consolidation, by not netting our inter-unit or inter
sectoral flows.

A practical problem is that one must work with available

data, relying frequently upon the aggregated estimates provided by offi
ciaL and other sources.
The estimation procedure in this essay is to aggregate.domestic spend
ing units into three sectors, government, private corporate business, and
the personal sector.

1

In addition there is a domestic financial sector

(which for our aggregative purposes is not defined as a spending unit).
The rest-of-the-world sector enters the financial data only.

This sec

toring is determined essentially by the limitations of Japan's national
1A more detailed discussion of estimation methods and sources appears
in the appendix on data.
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accounts and flow of funds data.

The government sector includes central and

local government and government corporations; it excludes government finan
cial institutions, which are included in the financial sector.

Given the

degree of centralization of government decision-making in Japan it is not
unreasonable to regard the government sector as relative homogeneous. The
corporate sector is somewhat less so; the most important heterogeneity, in
terms of finance, is the differential access to the financial system of
large and small firms, or firms of different degrees of risk.

Unsatisfyingly

heterogeneous is the personal sector, including as it does farmers, other
unincorporated enterprises, wage-earners, capital-share recipients, and
self-employed professionals--each presumably with somewhat different saving,
investment, wealth, and portfolio composition goals and differential bor
rowing access to the financial system.

Under present data collection methods

it is difficult to divide this sector further, particularly on the financial
side.
The three spending sectors do all the saving and investing in the do
mestic economy.

As is discussed below, they utilize to one degree or

another all the mechanisms for financing their investment.

They need funds

not just to finance their own investment, but also to maintain or enhance
their own liquidity (relative to real capital), and to support the expendi
tures of other spending units.

To obtain funds they issue primary claims-

i.e., borrow by stock or bond issue, loans, etc.

2

All their liabilities

(excluding retained earnings and earnings-related reserves) are in prin
ciple their primary liabilities, held as primary assets by other spending
2
1 use the standard Gurley-Shaw terminology in referring to primary
and indirect claims.
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units and by the financial system.

The financial sector's liabilities (money,

time deposits, insurance, etc.) are entirely classified as indirect claims,
including their stock issue.

Thus, though both the financial sector and

the spending sectors can hold both primary and indirect assets, only the
financial sector can issue indirect liabilities and only the spending sec
tors can issue primary liabilities.

The rest-of-the-world sector's assets

and liabilities, in relation to Japan, are regarded by convention as primary
securities (the sole exception to the rule that the financial sector cannot
create primary liabilities).
Table 1 provides data on the relative importance of alternative sources
of the financing of investment for the three spending sectors for the period
1954-1967.

It is a sources and uses flow accounting.

Annual savings and

investment flows have been cumulated, and the net change in financial assets
and liabilities outstanding between December 31, 1953 and December 31, 1967
estimated.

(This understates the effect of finance because the issuance of

primary and indirect claims is net of retirement of such claims during the
period).

Indirect claims are, slightly underestimated because intrafinan

cial sector claims are somewhat netted out in available flow of funds data.
A number of conclusions, many well known, are supported by the data.
First, the total increase in primary debt between 1954-1967 equalled
the cumulated gross investment for the period.
compared with other countries. 3

This is a high ratio as

Similarly in stock terms Japan has a high

3For international comparisons see Raymond W. Goldsmith, The Deter
minants of Financial Structure (Paris: Development Centre, OECD, 1966),
and his Financial Structure and Development (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1969). That the ratio in Japan is almost unity is a curious
coincidence, for which I have no explanation.

Table 1
SOURCES AND USES OF FUNDS BY SPENDING SECTOR, 1954-1967
(billion yen)

Sources of Fun_ds_ (Liabilities)
(S)

(Pl)

Internal-Gross Domestic Saving
Net Saving
Capital Consumption Allowances
External-total
Primary Security Issue
Stock Issue
Bond Issue
Loans-domestic
Loans-foreign
Trade Credit
Other
Indirect Security Issue

Total

Corporate
Sector

Personal
Sector

Government
Sector

32,589.1
12,117.2
20,471.9

42,342.0
32.611.5
9,730.5

21,232.8
18,550.1
2,682.7

67,546.3
67,546.3
6,698.3
2,069.4
33,663.7
2,021.6
22,599.1
494.2

15,941.2
15,941.2

10,228.6
10,228.6

0

0
0

9,446.0
0

6,409.9
85.3
0

Financial
Sector

96,163.9
63,278.8
32,885.1
67,503.7
1,555.3

65, 94} .4

161,221.8
95,272.4
6,698.3
8,572.2
46,482.9
3,769.2
29,009.0
740.8
65,949.4

67,503.7

257,385.7

0

6,502.8
3,373.2
191.3

1,555.3

0

161.3
0

100,135.4

58,283.2

31,461.4

48,925.6
40,435.2
38,793.1
1,642.1
8,490.4

20,258.6
19,359.6
7,513.8
11,845.8
899.0
38,857.3

26,004.1
25,071.4
23,802.3 .
1,269.1
932.7
4,465.3

Total Domestic
Econolll1.

Use~ of Funds (Assets)
(I)

Gross Domestic Investment
Fixed
Plant and Equipment
Housing
Inventories
Financial-tota l

{P)
a

Note:

Primary Claims
Stock
Bonds
Trade Credit
Loans-domestic
Loans-foreign
Other

50,099.2
32,415.5
1,638.8
534.2
29,009.0
0

1,131.0
102.5

4,006.7
2,698.9
854.9
0
0
0

452.9

723.0
100.5
61.8
0
0

366.4
194.3

95,188.3
84,866.2
70,109.2
14,757.0
10,322.1
67,442.4

160,864.2

57,769.6
2,260.1
7,121.3

94,914.8
6,698.3
8,572.2
29,009.0
46,482.9
3,411.6
740.8

0

46,482.9
1,914.2
-8.9

Primary assets differ from primary liabilities by the difference in foreign loans, since the
rest-of-the-wo rld sector is excluded; similarly saving differs from investment, due also to
statistical discrepancies in estimation.
Sourc~:.. See Appendix, -on ,.-Data..-. · .• • •

.....II

Table 1 (continued)

(F)

Indirect Claims
Money
Time and Saving Deposits
Trust
Insurance
Bank Bonds
Securities Investment Trust
Stock and Equity in
Financial Institutions
Other

Total
Discrepancy: Sources-Uses

Government
Sector

Corporate
Sector

Personal
Sector

17,683.7
5,925.8
8,417.6
736.2
0
271.2
17.8

34,850.6
6,777.5
17,411.2
2,237.3
4,975.3
1,294.3
795.8

3,742.3
336.6
479.6
28.1
0
0

339.9
1,975.2

444.0
915.2

99,024.8
1,110.6

Financial
Sector

Total Domestic
Economx_

2,269.4
51.3

65,949.4
13,564.9
26,520.6
3,145.4
4,975.3
3,834.9
864.9

316.6
2,581.4

0
6,471.1

1,100.5
11,942.9

59,115.9

30,469.4

67,442.4

256,052.5

-832.7

992.0

63.3

1,333.2

0

9,672.8
525.0
212.2
143.8
0

I

co
I
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ratio of primary securities to real national wealth.

The financial

interrelations ratio (the ratio of all financial assets--both primary and
indirect securities--to real national wealth) is also very large, at a level
shared only by England (a legacy of its government war debt) and Switzer,
land (as international financial intermediary).

About 70 percent of the

increase in Japanese primary debt was issued by corporate business, and only
slightly over 10 percent by the government sector.
Second, the foreign sector has been unimportant either as a source of
financing of domestic investment or as a use of domestic saving.

The small

influence of foreign financing is true for each of the spending sectors, and
for the financial sector too.

This is not inconsistent with the view that

foreign borrowing has been important for Japan's postwar growth by easing
the balance of payments constraint, or significant for certain firms or in
dustries.
Third, the taxation method of accumulating saving has been of some im
portance, accounting for almost one-fifth of gross saving and almost one
third of net saving.

While substantial, these ratios are not unusual; for

example, they are higher in France and West Germany.

The presumption is

that government saving has been used virtually entirely to finance govern
ment investment--in large part directly but to some extent also by the
transfer of government sector saving to government financial institutions
to be lent to government sector institutions.

Typically the central govern

ment saves enough to finance more than its own investment, transferring the
remainder by a bewildering variety of routes to finance (part of) the ex
cess investment of local governments and public corporations.

Thus the
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taxation mechanism has financed about four-fifths of government sector in
vestment, but none of the economy's private investment.

Rather government

financial institutions (part of the financial sector) issued indirect
liabilities (mostly postal savings deposits and life insurance) to private
spending sectors, and lent to all three spending sectors.
Fourth, self-finance by capital consumption allowances has been sub
stantial, amounting to one-third of gross investment (and gross saving) for
the economy as a whole and to more than 40 percent of the corporate sector's
gross investment.

As in the United States and West Germany, Japanese cor

porate depreciation is almost double its net saving by retaining profits.
Though capital consumption allowances were about the same proportion of GNP
in the early 19S0's as in the United States, the ratio in Japan has sub
sequently increased substantially (from 7.0 percent of GNP in 1952 to 12.8
percent in 1967).

While Japan's depreciation laws are somewhat more lenient

than in the United States, the main reason for the increase in the ratio has
been the continuing surge of private fixed investment.
Fifth, trade credit has been large--30 percent of total primary security
liabilities and 33 percent of corporate sector borrowing.

Significantly,

the increase in trade credit was more than 2 1/2 times as great as corporate
investment in inventories (and a substantially larger multiple in the case
of the personal sector, mainly for unincorporated business).

Trade credit

has been used in Japan not simply to finance inventories, but also for
fixed investment and the increase in financial assets.
While foreign financing can be dismissed as unimportant and financing
by taxation, while not trivial, relegated to the government sector, it is
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much more difficult to determine the relative importance of self-finance and
of financial intermediation.
equals investment,

4

For the economy as a whole saving necessarily

which tends to obliterate the real importance of finan
On the other hand, Japan has had a very large increase

cial intermediation.

in spending unit primary liabilities.

As a first approximation, the range

within which a sector's investment has been financed internally or exter
nally can be estimated by making the following two hypotheses which deter
mine the upper and lower limits: savings are used entirely for self-finance
of investment, and any excess in investment and increase in financial assets
is financed by borrowing (issuance of primary liabilities) or, savings are
used first to reduce primary liabilities and to increase financial assets,
while investment is financed out of new borrowing (issuance of primary
liabilities).

S.1

Symbolically, the upper limit on self- finance is
1 - .2:.

limit on self-finance is
is

Pl.
' l.
I.

I.]_

an d

Ii

s.
the corresponding lower limit on external finance is

,

the lower

Pli
1 - - - and the upper limit on external finance
Ii

, where

1

I.= investment of spending sector
1

Si= saving of spending sector

i

i

Pli = issuance of primary debt of spending sector
P . = holding of primary assets of spending sector
a1

F.

1

and by definition

=

holding of indirect assets of spending sector

i
i
i

·- I. + P . + F.
1

ai

1

4Plus net foreign investment (small for Japan) and statistical dis
crepancy (also small, ¥979.0 billion cumulatively for 1954-1967).
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These maximum and minimum limits of external financing of investment by
sector are given in Table 2.

Table 2
Maximum and Minimum Limits of the External
Financing of Investment, 1954-1967
(in percent)
Gross Investment
Maximum
Minimum

Net Investment
Maximum
Minimum

Corporate

138.0

33.3

236 .0

57.6

Personal

78.3

-108.4

151.4

-126.4

Government

39.2

18.5

43.9

20.4

100.1

-1.1

153.0

-1.6

National Economy

Any value greater than 100 indicates borrowing (primary security issue)
greater than investment; any negative value indicates saving greater than
corresponding investment.

For example, at a minimum one-third of corporate

sector gross investment was financed externally, and at a maximum it all
was, while in addition financial assets were increased (by 38 percent of
gross investment) by borrowing.

The upper and lower limits are at a lower

level for the government sector than in some other countries, but consider
ably higher for the corporate sector.
Another measure of the degree of reliance upon external finance for
the economy as a whole is the ratio of the sum of the cumulation of the
absolute value of the annual saving-investment gap by sector to twice the
I (Ii - Si) I 5
cumulated total investment, e.g.,
The corporate

ti

2LI
t

5

rf all investment were self-finance, Ii - S. = 0 , then the ratio would
1
be 0; if all investment were externally financed, the ratio would be 1.
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sector consistently invested more than it saved between 1954-1967, the per
sonal sector consistently saved more, while the government sector usually,
but not always, invested more than it saved.

The ratio is 23.1 percent.

This is a minimum estimate of the economy's degree of reliance on external
finance because it is based on the assumption that all saving in a sector
is used for self-finance by individual spending units.

This assumption may

be reasonable for the government sector, (which I regard as a single, homo
g8neous, decision-making unit), though of course central government does
finance local government and government corporations.

But in the corporate

and personal sectors there occurs both direct intra-sectoral lending by
surplus to deficit units (such as trade credit, stock purchase of related
firms, or individuals lending to unincorporated enterprises or to relatives
to finance housing investment); and inter-sectoral lending, either direct
(trade credit) or through the financial system (some individuals depositing
at banks, others borrowing from the banks).

In other words, even within a

surplus (deficit) spending sector there are likely to be individual deficit
(surplus) spending units.

Further sectoral disaggregation would result in

a higher estimate of the minimum share of external financing of investment.
In practice it is unlikely that any spending units behave according
to either of the extreme hypotheses underlying Table 2.

(I suspect that

they think more in terms of first using saving, rather than primary debt
issue, to finance investment, while recognizing that internal sources are
completely inadequate to finance desired expansion).

Firms and individuals

desire to increase both their real capital stock and their portfolio of
financial assets, and to do so are willing both to save and to borrow.

The
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problem is to determine whether there are stable behavioral patterns which
determine choices among these alternatives, to specify them, and to measure
them; however, that task is beyond the scope of this paper.
The degree of reliance upon, of utilization of, financial intermedia
tion depends both upon the preferences of spending units and the availability
of finance.

The external financing of a deficit spending unit by a surplus

spending unit can occur in three ways: direct borrowing (issuance of primary
securities) by deficit to surplus units without any intermediary; sale of
new primary security issue, notably stocks and bonds, to spending units
through financial markets, involving intermediation but no creation of in
direct claims; and investors borrowing from (issuing primary securities to)
financial institutions, which make payment in their indirect liabilities
either directly or by exchanging those liabilities for the cash of surplus
spending units.
Of the total increase in primary claims the financial sector absorbed
almost two-thirds, and the corporate sector slightly more than a third, while
the personal and government sectors purchased only small proportions,

As

already noted trade credit looms large in the total issuance of primary
claims and constitutes 90 percent of corporate sector primary assets.

For

individual firms its importance as a source of working capital often ex
ceeds that of financial institution loans; in order to compete
no firm could dispense with trade receivables.

in sales

The financial system's in

crease in primary assets has been predominantly in loans (80 percent)
another 12 percent was in corporate and government sector bonds.
Let us examine the alternative means of external finance.

First,
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the pri~ary claims issues transferred directly from the issuing spending unit
to a financing sp£nding unit, without recourse to financial intermediation,
are the following: trade credit, corporate and government sector holding of
stocks and equity other than stocks (assumed to be in affiliated and sub
sidiary companies), corporate and personal sector holding of public cor
poration bonds (such as purchase of Telephone and Telegraph and Japan Na
tional Railway bonds by users), and government sector holding of government
sector bonds.

The direct financing share of total primary security issue

between 1954-1967 was 33.7 percent, almost all in the form of trade credit.
Second, the shire of primary security financing through purchase in
financial markets (stocks and bonds) by spending units was small, only 3.3
percent.
issue.

6

Almost all (87 peccent) of this was in purchase of new stock
The complete unimportance of organized capital markets as a mechan

ism whereby son~e srending units rather directly financed others is somewhat
surprisirg even thou:;h the small reliance on stock and bond issue is well
known.

Overall, stock and bond issue comprised only 16.1 percent of pri

mary security issue.

Of this,2.8 percentage points was directly placed,

3.3 percentage points sold to other spending units through the capital
markets, and 1O.O pe:rcentage points purchased by financial intermediaries
(not alwc:::,s willingly).

The generally unattractive pegged yields on new

bond issues have restricted demand.

The system of issuance of stocks at

par rather than market, corporate tax advantages for interest relative
to divident payments, and corporate policy of fairly high dividend rates
6

As noted in thP. appendix, stock is valued at issue price rather than
subsequent nnrket price because this represents the funds issuing corpora
tions re,::.;~ive..:1 and buyers paid.
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relative to par, all restrict the supply of new stock issue.
Third, external finance by financial intermediaries has been of domi
nant importance; they provided 63 percent of all the external funds obtained
(net primary securities issued) by spending units between 1954 and 1967.
Financial institutions financed these asset holdings by issuing their own
indirect liabilities to spending units (and themselves).

About one-fifth

of the increase in financial system liabilities consisted of money, and
another two-fifths of time and savings deposits; insurance, 7.6 percent of
the total increase, was in third place.

Layering (the proportion of total

indirect claims held by financial institutions themselves) amounted to 14.6
percent. 7

The main components of layering have been private financial in-

stitution purchase of long-term credit bank bonds, Government Trust Fund
Bureau loans to government banks, Bank of Japan loans to commercial banks,
and call loans.

III. Characteristics of the Japanese Financial System
This description of the relative importance of financial intermedia
tion in postwar Japan has concentrated mainly on a quantitative delimita
tion of the alternative sources of financing investment, and particularly
on the importance of external finance and financial intermediation.

We

need to consider also the role of external finance from the viewpoints of
the three spending sectors.

Before turning to that--and then only in a pre

liminary way--it is desirable to appraise, or at least to suggest hypotheses
7
Layering and total indirect security issue are slightly understated
because certain transactions among financial institutions--n otably between
agricultural and other credit cooperatives and their prefectural and na
tional institutions--h ave been netted out in the flow of funds data.
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about, the characteristics of Japan's financial system.
The most important feature of Japan's financial system is that most of
its components are in disequilibrium most of the time; it is a disequilibrium
system.

By this I do not mean simply that the dynamics of rapid growth, and

the considerable cyclical fluctuations in growth, sharply and repeatedly
alter the desired optimal po~tfolios of real and financial wealth so that
the system is never in static or dynamic equilibrium, though this is true.
Rather, a structure of interest rates has been imposed by the monetary au
thorities (including the government), and on the whole supported by oli
gopolistic financial institutions, which results in demand for credit in
various forms greater than supply.

Financial institutions cannot borrow

as much as they want at given interest rates from (surplus) spending units;
investors (deficit spending units) cannot borrow as much as they want from
financial intermediaries.
Japanese financial markets,

Since the price mechanism does not clear most
8

the system relies importantly on credit

rationing; for many types of financial claims it is availability rather
than the interest rate which determines the allocation of credit.

This

situation results from the fact that in Japan's rapid-growth economy~
ante investment has tended to be greater than ex ante saving.

While

availability (credit rationing) dominates interest rates as the mechanism
for financial allocation more in Japan than in other countries, I suspect
that in the actual dynamics of rapid growth in many countries--developed
8
A number of grey market practices, such as under-the-table additional
interest payments on large time deposits, have naturally developed but they
are not sufficiently large to achieve equilibrium in most financial mar
kets. See H.T. Patrick, "Interest Rates and the Grey Financial Market in
Japan," Pacific Affairs, Winter 1965-66.

I
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and underdeveloped--credit availability rather than cost is considerably
more important than usually recognized.
The relative importance of rationing versus market (flexible interest
rate) mechanisms of determining the flow of financial claims varies con
siderably by type of security.

The interest rate on virtually all indirect

securities is fixed; financial institutions scarcely use price competition
at all in trying to attract asset holders to hold their liabilities.

In

other words there is no flexibility in price competition; what price com
petition exists comes from differences in maximum rates by maturity or
type.
The

maximum interest rates on bank and postal short-term, time and

savings deposits and trust deposits are relatively low and almost completely
unchanging; they have been the actual rates.

Even financial institution

stock, the price of which is market-determined, has been constrained by
restrictions on dividend pay-out rates.

The only indirect claim which has

had its yield determined primarily by market forces is call money.

Even

it is not fully market-determined since the Bank of Japan directly if in
formally influences movements in the rate in tight money periods, notably
in 1967-68.

Moreover, entry into the market, either as lender or borrower,

is restricted to financial institutions,
Primary security issues on the whole are influenced somewhat more by
interest rates and market forces, but far less so than in most other industrial countries.
9

Stock prices are fully market-determined, 9 but as

Though there may be imperfect knowledge, manipulation, high trans-

actions costs, and other practices which make the market imperfect.
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noted the historical institutional convention of issuing at par rather than
market and differential tax treatment of interest and dividend payments make
stock issue a relatively expensive source of corporate funds.

The demand

a~.d supply of foreign loans are equilibrated in foreign markets; however,

the Japanese government restricts private and government entry both as
demanders and suppliers.
The most important market sources of spending unit external funds are
loans from private and government institutions.

Government loans are typi

cally at uncompetitively low rates in order to encourage certain specified
activities; demand far exceeds supply so that credit rationing is fully
operative.

Government loans comprised 16.5 percent of the total net in

crease in loans between 1954 and 1967; of these 39 percent went to the
government sector, 43 percent to corporate business, and 18 percent to
the personal sector.
Some market-determined flexibility in effective interest rates exists
for private loans, but not sufficient to equilibrate demand with supply
completely except perhaps in very easy money periods.

Maximum legal inter

est rates on loans determine de facto nominal rates which are maintained
by ccrtel arrangements through bank national associations.

These rates

move in small amounts with changes in the Bank of Japan discount rate,
insufficient to provide much flexibility in nominal rates.

Effective

interest rates on loans are somewhat more flexible because of the wide
spread use of required compensatory deposits (kosoku yokin, including
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buzumi and ryodate). 10

This enables banks both to raise effective rates and,

more important, to discriminate among borrowers of different risk classes by
effective interest rate differentials rather than simply by credit rationing.
This function of kosoku yokin is desirable, because otherwise financial in
stitutions would have no incentive to lend for riskier but potentially
highly efficient and profitable investment activities.

However, the ac

tual differential application of kosoku yokin has apparently been primarily
between large and small borrowers.

Existing effective interest rate dif

ferentials greatly exceed the differences in creditworthiness as measured
by actual loan losses.

Even with high effective interest rates on loans

to small borrowers their demand for funds tends to be greater than supply
(for any given risk category); in the rationing of credit, small firms are
discriminated against, even though it is more profitable to make loans to
them,

This is because city bank, long-term credit bank, and trust bank

policies are to lend primarily to large borrowers even though it is less
profitable.

11

In general, it is the availability of bank loans, rather

10
The amount of kosoku yokin overstates both loans and time deposits
of commercial banks; no adjustment has been made in the tables above. Ap
plying the Ministry of Finance's somewhat low estimates of kosoku yokin
rates as of May 1968 for city banks, local banks, mutual banks, and credit
associations corporate deposits as of March 1968 indicates that on average
(weighted) about 10 percent of total deposits, and 20 percent of time de
posits, are an overstatement of actual effective loans and deposits.
11
This poses a major problem for analyses based on the assumption of
bank profit-maximizing behavior. I am attracted to the theory of Professor
Suzuki Kinzo (in his Ginko Kodo noRiron)that city banks try to maximize
market share (loans or cteyosits), subject probably to a profits constraint.
I also find attractive Professor Komiya's theory that an important objective
of management is to develop and maintain stable and close relations with as
many large, prestigious corporations as possible, in order to provide job
opportunities for senior management upon retirement. A more accurate
characterization of financial institution lending behavior is probably
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than their cost, which constrains demand to the amounts banks are able to
supply.
There is even less flexibility in the interest rate on government in
dustrial, and bank bonds and government short-term securities.

The coupon

interest rate and the issuance terms are in effect fully controlled.

Inter

est rates are low relative to loan and call money rates; moreover, they
moved seldom and only slightly over the past decade.

Most bond issues have

been forced upon financial institutions-- it is one of the prices they have
had to pay for government cooperation in other areas.

To prevent discrepan

cies between fixed issuance yields on new bonds and freely market-determin ed
yields (at higher yields and lower prices) on already issued bonds it has
been necessary to restrict the development of a real bond market. It has
informally but effectively been made clear to financial institutions, which
hold almost all bonds not directly placed, that they are expected to hold
newly purchased bonds to maturity, rather than sell them in the open mar
ket.

The Bank of Japan has in effect intervened to peg the price of

national bonds since they are held by individuals as well as financial
institutions.

Since 1967 there has been some trading in bonds and changes

in yields, particularly for long-term credit bank debentures.

The only

Footnote 11 continued
in terms of different credit risk categories rather than borrowing firm size,
though the two are highly correlated. If financial institutions divide bor
rowing customers into, say, three credit categories of prime risk, inter
mediate risk, and higher risk, they may well behave as risk averters by
fully supplying prime borrower demand for credit at all times and at rela
tively low effective interest rates. In contrast, the highest risk category
is almost always subject to credit rationing despite high effective rates
(and higher profitability after considering actual losses and associated
costs). Whether credit rationing prevails for the intermediate category
depends upon the general ease or tightness of credit.
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debentures which have been traded freely over a long period of time are
Telephone

&

Telegraph discount bonds {dendensai) sold to users at the time

of telephone installation.

Given the tight controls over the bond market

it is not surprising that bonds have been only a negligible source of
spending unit external finance.
Trade credit is arranged directly between borrower and lender con
commitant with sales transactions, so it does not go through an organized
financial market,

Data are not readily available on the structure of

effective interest rates on trade credit or on the use of flexible changes
in effective interest rates as an equilibrator of changes in supply and/or
demand.

Presumably demand and supply are equilibrated not so much by ef

fective interest rate changes as by agreement based on purchase and sale
amounts.

Even so the extension of trade credit maturities beyond "normal"

length by strong borrowing firms versus weak sellers constitutes an impor
tant mechanism for passing on the burden of a tight money period.
again

Once

it is availability that counts.
The interest rate structure--with the exception of call money and

dendensai rates--·has not changed much over the course of the business
cycles of the past fifteen years even though there have been major shifts
in both supply and demand schedules for financial claims.

Consequently

the excess of demand over supply has fluctuated substantially, being
greatest in the late stages of a boom and early stages of the tight money
induced recession, and least in the bottom phase of recession and begin
ning phase of the next boom.

In brief periods of easy money the financial

system's structure of interest rates may have been determined by market
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demand and supply; most of the time, however, rationing and direct controls
have been highly influential in financial markets.

IV.

Criteria of a "Good" Financial System and Japan's Performance
There are numerous criteria for a "good" financial system.

Six impor

tant criteria are listed below, together with a general assessment of the
performance of the Japanese financial system in terms of these criteria.
1.

To provide the means of payment (money) cheaply, efficiently and

elastically in order to satisfy the transactions demands of the economy
consonant with overall economic policy objectives.
Japan has had a very elastic supply of
tions and liquidity demands.

money, well m8eting transac

The means of effective payment for transac

tions is only moderately efficient however, since payment by check, giro
transfers, or bank credit cards are scarcely used at all by individuals
and small businesses.

The time spent in making payment by curre~cy is

excessive and involves external diseconomies, exemplified by the mid
month and month-end and year-end scurrying around, and resultant traffic
jams, to settle accounts.

In addition large banks have hired a dispro

portionate share of the country's best university graduates and kept them
too long in such menial tasks as counting money and door-to-door solici
ting of deposits.
2.

To raise the saving rate and to mobilize the savings of surplus

spending units by offering a wide spectrum of financial claims--differing
in liquidity, maturity, risk, yield and special service characteristics
(such as insurance)--to satisfy the v~rious demands of savers.
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Japanese financial institution s do indeed cffer a wide rcnge of indirect
securities to assetholder s and have well mobilized the saving of surplus
spending units.

Nonetheless , while the financial system does exist in com

plex and manifold form, more important in the mobilizatio n of saving are
the facts that individual saving in Japan has been such a large proportion
of disposable income; that individuals have pYeferred (or have been con
strained) to hold financial rather than real assets; and that the corporate
sector has desired to hold indirect securities in addition to money.

The

supply of indirect securities has followed the demand of assetholder s.
It is difficult to judge the extent to which the activities of the
financial system have enhanced the saving rate in the econo:",y.

By and

large I regard it as presenting an opportunity rather th:m a direct cs.use.
Probably not much of the major increase in the saving ~ate of individuals
or the total economy since 1953 can be attributed to i::ipro-.rcments in the
financial system; on the other hand the saving rate would have been con
siderably lower if the financial syste7Il had r..ot been able to increase the
supply of safe, liquid indirect securities uadE.r co~:ditions of reasonable
price stability.

Indeed, certain defic.ienci'.~ s of the fin3LCii11 syotefl

may have raised the saving rate, notc'.bly of those \\ho Wcmted to mr1ke lur.:py
expenditure s and hence became tc1.rget savers.

Fin2.ncial inte:cmcdi::-x ies

have not made much credit available for purchase of consm1er durables, the
higher education expenses of an individt•al, or housinB.

Lack of avail

ability and high cost of credit to small busin2ss, unincorpora ted and in
corporated, plus high profit opportuniti es, have provided incentives to
self-financ e by increasing saving.

This argu~e~t should not be pushed too
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far, since it implies that all investment should be self-financed to maximize
the saving rate.
3.

To allocate funds efficiently for growth by meeting the lending

needs (i.e., purchasing the primary securities) of a wide spectrum of good
borrowers (deficit spending units), through differentiation of primary se
curities in terms of risk, yield, liquidity, maturity.

It is particularly

important that long-term investment demand be adequately financed.

In this

way the financial systems lengthens the maturity of primary claims, overcomes indivisibilities, provides diversification, and reduces risk by pooling-
thus intermediating between the different liquidity and risk preferences of
savers and borrowers.
It is extremely difficult to appraise empirically the efficiency of
finance in determining the size and pattern of investment, particularly
since wo do not know in concrete detail what constitutes the most efficient
investment pattern for Japanese growth.

In a very crude sense we must say

that the Japanese financial system has been extraordinarily successful:
economic growth has been rapid, the contribution of investment to growth
has been important, external finance has been vital for corporate invest
ment.

The financial system has discriminated against the financing of

consumption, of the production of many consumer personal s~rvices, and of
housing investment in favor of private business fixed productive invest-

. h its
.
1 ow capita
. 1-output ratio.
. 12
ment wit
12

In a high aggregate demand

The system has discriminated against small business despite its
even lower capital-output ratio. Whether this was harmful to growth can
not be answered until the relationship of technological induction and
innovation by scale of firm has been adequately analyzed.
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economy this has promoted growth,though at some expense in welfare per unit
of growth.
More empirical research on the efficiency of financial system alloca
tion among alternative industries is needed.

So-called "key industries"

have been financed adequately, in substantial part by government financial
institutions,

Mr. Kosai's study

13

indicated that rapidly growing industries

did indeed obtain a rapid growth of external financing as compared with more
slowly growing industries, but the cause and effect relationship remains
somewhat unclear.
4.

To maintain efficient, closely interconnected financial markets

whereby changes in supplies of or demands for certain primary or indirect
securities can quickly be reflected in the prices and/or yields of all
securities.

This can be achieved either by sufficient overlapping of

specialized financial institutions' activities along the spectrum of
alternative securities, or by a number of financial institutions which
operate over a wide range of the spectrum (such as mixed banking).
Japan has a relatively wide range of financial intermediaries well
covering the spectrum of risk and maturity of primary security issue.
Early postwar Japanese government policy was to continue the development
of a series of specialized financial institutions differentiated by type
of indirect claim issued, type of customer (both borrower and saver),
and/or maturity, with relatively little overlap.

Gradually commercial

banks have come to operate over a wider range of the spectrum, a favorable
13Y. Kosai et al., "Shikin Haibun Mechanism no Kento," Keizai Geppo
(Economic Planning Agency, July 1964).
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development which probably should be encouraged further.

Moreover, groups

of financial intermediaries of different types--such as a city bank, trust
bank, insurance company, long-term credit bank, and correspondent local
banks--coordinate their lending to individual borrowers to provide both
short-term and long-term loans.

The inefficiency in the system lies not

in a lack of institutions, or an undue degree of risk avoidance, but in
the restriction of the market mechanism due to controlled interest rates.
5.

To protect the financial system against the risks of sharp changes

in assetholder portfolio preference, default, and debilitating inflation.
a)

Sharp shifts in portfolio preference, notably increased demand

for money and decreased demand for deposits, can lead to liquidity crises
and monetary panics involving loss of confidence and bank runs.

This prob

lem is most appropriately met by a central bank as lender of last resort;
the social cost of bearing this risk is negligible while the benefits of
panics foregone are very large.

Where capital markets do not operate well

and financial institutions (notably banks) are to be encouraged to have an
asset portfolio of much longer average maturity than liabilities, assurance
of central bank willingness to discount a wide range of securities in a
crisis is vital.
b)

Default risk due to the bankruptcy of an individual financial

institution is important not only because of the effect on depositors but
the impact on assetholder confidence in the financial system.

The cost

of default risk to holders of financial institution liabilities is ap
propriately borne by them, through deposit insurance schemes and regula
tion and inspection provisions (though these services can probably be
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best supplied by government agencies, with costs borne by the benefi-

•
A further question is whether society (through the central bank)

ciaries).

should bear part of the default risk of individual financial instutions,
and especially of large business borrowers from these institutions.

This

is particularly important in highly leveraged situations such as in Japan.
When the socially optimal degree of risk-taking for growth is greater
than that dictated by the private market mechanism (usually the case),
then it is desirable for the central bank to absorb part of this risk.
c)

Protection of the financial system against erosion due to sub

stantial, sustained inflation depends upon the effectiveness of monetary
policy,

While theoretically it is possible to devise a financial system

impervious to inflation (through price index pegging of the nominal prices
of financial assets and liabilities and their returns), in practice this
has been seldom achieved.

Virtually all financial claims other than stock

have principal value and yield set in nominal terms.

Inflation is a com

petitive alternative to finance.
The Japanese system is well protected against risks of monetary panics
and of default.
resort.

The Bank of Japan operates effectively as lender of last

All large financial institutions are in fact guaranteed against

risk of bankruptcy: the Bank of Japan, concerned over the impact on public
confidence, will undoubtedly rescue any financial institution in risk of
default and bankruptcy with massive loans.
security brokerage firms.

This includes even the major

It has also supported the stock market when

prices declined sharply, and presumably would do so again in the future.
Because large corporations are typically such large borrowers from
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financial institutions (relative to the net worth of each), the Bank of Japan
also in effect absorbs a substantial portion of their risk of default.
guarantee does not extend to smaller borrowers.

This

Probably the assurance that

bankruptcy due to illiquidity is highly unlikely has been an important en
couragement to large corporate enterprises to undertake new, risky invest-

.

ment proJects. 14
While consumer prices have risen at 5-6 percent annually for the last
decade, this has not been sufficient to arouse widespread distrust of the
financial system, to discourage spending units from demanding indirect
claims.

Apparently liquidity and safety of principal nominal amount domi

nate yield consideratio ns for most individuals within the range of rate of
inflation of the past decade.

The demand for money and deposits (including

time and saving deposits) appear to be rather inelastic to nominal and real
(price-defla ted) interest rate yields within the range that has prevailed.
6.

To be an effective vehicle for fiscal and monetary policy.

The

financial system can normally handle the technical financial side of fiscal
policy fairly easily since the central bank usually acts as agent on behalf
of the government and since government debt is regarded as the most risk
less of all domestic primary securities (this does not hold for certain
local governments and perhaps certain government corporation s).

An effec

tive monetary policy requires the timely knowledge and will of the monetary
authorities to use their instruments of control, and the rapid and substan
tial impact of changes in financial assets and debts on real expenditure s
14
Management has been constrained from taking on as much risk as possible
by the knowledge that in event of failure or even serious difficultie s
they will be replaced at the instigation of financing institution s.
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on goods and services by spending units.
Because of strong private aggregate demand until the 1965 recession,
the government did not have to rely upon deficit financing substantially,
so that its demands upon the financial system for
the implementation of
\
fiscal policy have been relatively limited in amount.

Yet the demands in

terms of the implications for the rigidity of the interest rate structure,
and for the ways in which monetary policy is implemented, have been severe;
and they have existed for the entire period, not just since 1965,

The

government insistence on pegging the rate on government securities while
assuring a market for them has meant that all other bond rates had to be
pegged as well--with the result that the bond market is virtually non
existent.

In recent years the Bank of Japan has had to purchase government

bonds as interest rates firm up in order to peg their price.

This could

undermine a tight monetary policy; thus far it has not been a really seri
ous problem because the Bank can adjust down its large portfolio of loans
to commercial banks.

More important, government pressure to constrain

call money increases in the 1967-68 period of restriction seriously under
mined the effectiveness of monetary control.
Once the Bank of Japan has decided to implement a restrictive monetary
policy, it has been quite effective in reducing (the rate of growth of)
corporate and personal expenditures, mainly by restricting inventory in
vestment, but also business fixed investment.

However, the Bank of

Japan's implementation of monetary policy does not rely primarily upon
the cost effect of interest rate changes; rather it depends upon ration
ing, of both its own credit to the financial system and city bank and
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other large bank loans to business.

This is both a cause and consequence

of having a disequilibrium financial system.

In the very short run the.

Bank of Japan cannot restrict its supply of credit to borrowing banks be
cause that might produce a liquidity crisis at daily closing; the Bank has
not seized the opportunity at such times to use the cost effect of interest
rates by imposing very high marginal interest rates on loans to banks.
The Bank of Japan's system of rationing the availability of credit
worked well until the 1967-68 period of restriction.

Then the pressure

to keep call rates low meant that lenders in the call market made loans
directly to business instead; the Bank of Japan's mechanism of direct con
The

trols extended over an insufficient portion at the financial system.
Bank of Japan was saved by the unanticipated surge of exports over the
period which obviated the need for a really tight money policy.

Some Further Thoughts
The above discussion does not go very far in making precise the nature,
much less the quantitative estimation, of the internationships among macro
financial and real variables for Japanese growth.

He need an integrated

theory which is both applicable to Japan and empirically testable.

The

most sophisticated approach would be a good macro-econometric model, but
there are real problems of specification.
growth, not stable equilibrium.

We are dealing with dynamic

I am not convinced that Japanese spend-

ing unit, or financial unit, behavior over the past fifteen years is
appropriately characterized as engaging in saying, investment and finan
cial flows primarily in order to achieve equilibrium desired stock levels
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of capital and wealth.

Indeed, I am not sure that Japanese spending units

think in terms of adjusting to equilibrium growth rates of desired capital
and wealth.

I suspect that desired stock positions have been altered by

the unexpectedly rapid growth and by cyclical fluctuations.

It may be

preferable simply to concentrate directly on the explanation of flows,
with causal factors other than desired equilibrium stock positions rela
tively more important.
I am concerned about the direction of causation between real and financial variables, particularly in a disequilibrium system in which rationing
rather than prices clear the market.

In a market system, the net issuance

of primary securities would depend on spending unit investment, saving, and
its desire for liquidity (indirect assets) and primary assets.
simple case of self-finance

P

1

=

In the most

f(I - S); where saving is divided among

investment and increase in financial assets, then

P

1

=

f(I, F, Pa), per

haps in the form

The interest rate enters indirectly, in explanations of
Both

F

and

P
a

I , P , and
a

F.

(mainly trade credit) can be regarded as depending mainly

on increase in sales (0), so that

However, in an availability system of credit rationing, the causal order may
be reversed: the level of investment is determined by the availability of
funds (demand for primary liabilities).

In such a case, with the marginal
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efficiency of investment considerably above the effective market interest rate
but credit not available, spending units try both to increase their own
saving and to minimize the holding of primary and indirect assets.
I= f(P , S)
1

and the demand for financial assets

(F + P)
a

Thus,

is an inversely

related function of the gap between desired and actual investment at the
given effective borrowing rate.

In an availability model we must concentrate

much more upon finance supply functions and allocation procedures.

Whichever

the case--interest cost or credit availability as a determinant of invest
ment--any comprehensive theory of finance must be integrated with a theory
of investment and saving,
To do so we need to disaggregate into relatively more homogeneous
sectors; indeed much research has already been done.

It is beyond the

scope of this paper to explore the theories of business~ personal, or
government financial behavior, but some general comments are warranted.
Individuals have had a strong preference for financial assets rela
tive to capital goods (due in part to lack of housing finance).

Among

financial assets, they apparently have a strong preference for safety and
maintenance of nominal value of principal (risk aversion, as evidenced by
preference of one-year time deposits to shares with relatively little
price fluctuation and higher yields), aversion to extreme illiquidity
(unwillingness to hold bonds--or money in trust--with higher yields than
one-year time deposits), and where willing to bear risk in financial as
sets it is mainly in stocks in expectation of capital gains rather than
dividend yield.
also important.

Convenience of location and other financial services are
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Analysis of the financing of personal sector investments makes clear
the heterogeneity of the sector.

Housing investment has been fairly large

despite the scarcity of housing mortgage funds and their high cost from
private sources.

Farmers have been able to finance agricultural invest

ment rather readily from agricultural cooperative and other local finan
cial institution loans, in addition to government agricultural financial
institutions loans on preferential terms.

Agriculture is one sector where

demand and supply of private funds are equilibrated by market forces be
cause of the existence of specialized financial institutions and because
of the tendency for farmers to save more than they invest.

Least is known

about the financing of unincorporated business investment.

The organized

financial system discriminates against it, so financing must come either
from internal sources or direct borrowing from relatives,• friends, and
moneylenders.
The corporate sector should be disaggregated further, at least into
large firms with highly diversified stock ownership and others.
large firms are not solely interested in maximizing profits.

Most

Ownership

and control are sufficiently separated that management has its own ob
jectives, such as growth of the firm, relative ranking in the industry,
and leadership.

Profits are one among several goals, or may be viewed

as a constraint: some minimum rate is required in order to quell stock
holder and lending financial institution discontent.

Similarly because

management has less interest in maximizing the present market value of
the firm a la Modigliani-Miller, it is not indifferent to alternative
forms of raising capital; indeed it regards stock issue as the most
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expensive source of external funds.
new shares at all.

(One question is why such firms issue

I suspect it is a combination of (a) pressure by lend

ing institutions and the Ministry of Finance, concerned about minimum net
worth ratios, and (b) some rule of thumb reasoning by management that it
is natural to increase stock issue every few years as total liabilities
and profits rise.
The substantial increases in both indirect and primary assets, as well
as investment and saving, by the corporate sector, are impressive.

Primary

security issue by the corporate sector to finance investment and increases
in financial assets is large indeed.

The minimum reliance on external

finance of investment (given in Table 2) is high.

Corporate primary asset

holding is almost completely in trade credit, while stock and bond holdings
are predominantly in related firms; the reasons for this pattern are
straightforward.

The increases in indirect claims, notably money and time

deposits need further, detailed analysis.

My view is that money is for

transactions purposes, has been already economized upon, and hence is rela
tively interest-inelastic.

Corporate time deposits are explained by a

mixture of motives: liquidity and timing inbalances between receipts and
expenditures; precautionary balances built up in easy money periods when
additions to loan balances are readily available and spent in tight money
periods when net additions to loan balances are difficult to obtain; and
required compensatory balances (kosoku yokin).
The financial side of the government sector is perhaps somewhat less
interesting.

The government, given its system of receipts, disbursements

and banking at the Bank of Japan, and its ability to create money, has no
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need for liquidity.
. 'bl e. 15
neg 1 igi

Its holdings of both primary and indirect claims are

Government issuance of primary securities is for two quite

distinct purposes: to finance deficits generated by fiscal policy in
periods of insufficient aggregate demand; and to obtain private saving
to finance government investment in a full employment economy.

The for

mer case--of excessive private saving relative to investment demand--has
generally not been a problem in postwar Japan; private demand has been so
strong that the government has not required a vigorous deficit-financed
aggregate demand policy.

Hence it has not needed to issue primary securi

ties for this purpose in any quantity except in 1965-66.
Even in a full employment economy it may be desirable for the govern
ment to compete with private investors for private saving as an alternative
to raising public saving by taxation.

This too the Japanese government has

not done to any great degree; in the competition for resources it has de
ferred to business fixed investment.

Thus, while engaging in 27 percent

of gross domestic investment between 1954 and 1967, government sector saving
was 22 percent of total saving, and primary security issue only 11 percent
of the total net increase in primary securities.

In the case of the govern

ment sector, neither availability nor cost of funds has to be a direct con
straint upon investment: it is omnipotent relative to the financial system.
Its constraints are political and bureaucratic.

Policymakers have to de

termine the relative share of government in total resources, and the ex
tent to which the government's expenditures will be financed by taxes or
15This is especially true if the "other" indirect claims are ignored;
this is a mixed bag of transactions with government financial institutions
and various balancing accounts, with little economic meaning.
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by primary security issue.

Bureaucracy exerts power not only by its recom

mendations on these issues, but also by supporting certain rules of thumb
("taxes no more than 20 percent of national income," "the government's
prestige suffers if it has to borrow at an interest rate greater than 7
percent, 11 etc.).
One final comment.

By the six criteria listed earlier Japan's finan

cial system ranks rather well.

This is supported by the substantial degree

of financial institution purchase of primary securities and issuance of
indirect liabilities.

However, the basic strength of the financial system

lies in the high rate of personal saving, personal sector preference for
financial assets, and the high rate of desired investment by business. It
would have taken a very bad financial system not to have intermediated
actively between the two.

Appendix on Data
This appendix describes the methods by which the estimates in Table 1
and in the text were prepared.

Essentially I have relied upon the official

national accounts of the Economic Planning Agency (EPA) and the flow of
funds data of the Bank of Japan (BOJ).
The basic national accounts source was EPA, Annual Report on National
Income Statistics, 1968 (Tokyo, 1968) and BOJ, Research Department, Keizai
Shobumon no Toshi Chochiku to Shikin Kabusoku (July, 1968).

The latter

contains detailed calendar year data (1957-1967) for the corporate and
personal sectors not published in the National Accounts Statistics, as
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well as the calendar 1967 estimates.

Calendar year estimates are not avail

able separately for corporate and personal sector investment components
for 1954-1955; these were estimated by applying the appropriate fiscal year
ratios to the calendar year data for the private (corporate plus personal)
sector.

For 1954-1955 dwelling depreciation was attributed 90 percent to

the personal sector and 10 percent to the corporate sector (based on 1956
and 1957 ratios), and damage was distributed among corporate, personal and
government sectors in proportion to their respective depreciation allowances;
the amounts are small.
The flow of funds estimation method does not perfectly match that of
the national accounts.

There are minor differences in sectoral definitions.

Flow of funds is on a cash basis, national income on accrual basis; use of
calendar year data overcomes the fiscal year difficulty that certain
government budgetary disbursements carried over to April or May are in
cluded in the previous fiscal year in the national accounts but in the
current fiscal year in flow of funds.

The mnj or difference lies in the

treatment of the net sale or purchase of land and used capital goods.
These transactions are excluded from investment and saving flows, but are
included in financial transactions.

Due mainly to land purchase, the

statistical discrepancy between the investment-saving gap and the finan
cial surplus or deficit has been negative and increasing over time for
the corporate and government sectors, and positive and increasing over
time for the personal sector.

Thus the sectoral discrepancies noted in

Table 1 are smaller than they probably should be.
The main adjustments in the flow of funds data involved the
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inclusion of government financial institutions in the financial sector, and
local government and public corporations in the government sector; grossing
of items netted out in sectoral columns; separation of certain row items
into their primary and indirect claim components; estimation of foreign
assets and liabilities by sector; adjustment for minor differences in as
set and liability valuation of certain claims; and adjustment of the
''others 11 item in the classification of financial assets and liabilities.

Flows over the period 1954-1957 were estimated as the difference between
assets and liabilities outstanding on December 31, 1967 and December 31,
1953 (the first year end for which flow of funds data are available), ex
cept for foreign borrowing and lending.
Most intra-sectoral financial transactions among financial institu
tions are netted out in the flow of funds data.

I have made gross esti

mates to the extent that the sub-sector detail in the published flow of
funds data allow, with the exception of money supply in order to maintain
the standard definition of money.

Gross estimates are provided for call

loans, government financial institutions loans to each other (notably
Trust Fund Bureau loans to government banks), private financial institu
tion loans to each other, and to some extent interfinancial institution
time deposits and money in trust.

Agricultural cooperative and credit

cooperative deposits at their prefectural federation institutions and
these in turn at the central level remain on a consolidated basis.
The flow of funds column and row classification intermingles certain
primary and indirect securities.

Public corporation bonds (mostly pri

mary securities) include some issued by government financial institutions
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(indirect securities); I arbitrarily assume that one-half of the latter
amount outstanding is owned by other government financial institutions
(Trust Fund Bureau mainly) and the other half by private financial insti
tutions--and none by spending units.

Government short-term security issue

includes Foreign Exchange Special Account bills (indirect securities);
assume they are all held by the Bank of Japan.

I

The stock and equity other

than stock of spending units are primary, of financial institutions are
indirect.

I assume that the latter are all held by the corporate and per

sonal sectors in proportion to their total respective holdings of stock;
financial institution other equity is distributed to the government sec
tor as well.

Loans of both private and public financial institutions in

clude loans to financial institutions (indirect securities) in addition
to loans to spending sectors.

In the process of including loans on a

gross rather than net basis the indirect security component was estimated
separately.
The estimation of foreign flows is more difficult because of lack of
published Bank of Japan stock data.

Foreign exchange was taken from pub

lished year-end stock figures, the Bank of Japan's holdings estimated from
its published balance sheet, and the remainder attributed to the govern
ment foreign exchange special account.

The annual foreign loan flows by

sector can readily be estimated from annual flow data in the flow of
funds accounts.

The 1953 stock figures are my own rough estimates; the

1967 stock is derived by adding the 1954-1967 flow to my 1953 stock esti
mate.

The data are somewhat rough because of changes in measurement and

definition which may not show up fully in annual flow data (for example,
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inclusion of the gold tranche in foreign exchange reserves was not reflected
in foreign exchange flow of funds data).

The flows between Japan and the

rest of the world are of the correct order of magnitude.
I value stock issue at purchase price since my purpose is to analyze
sources and uses of funds by sector, and since this procedure reflects the
funds actually received by issuers.

There remains a small difference in

stock valuation, as total stock assets are slightly greater than corporate
and financial institution stock liabilities.

The difference is added en

tirely to corporate liabilities on the assumption that stockholders ac
tually paid the amount their records show, while part of the proceeds went
into corporate capital surplus accounts.

There is also a minor difference

in government securities; liabilities are slightly greater than assets.
Some bondholders evidently purchased their bonds at prices below par.
Since redemption is at par, assets of each sector of bondholder have been
increased, in proportion to the share of total government bonds, to in
crease assets to the level of the bond liabilities.
The "others" category by sector is a residual of all other financial
accounts.

As such it is a hodgepodge.

It also contains all foreign

assets and liabilities in stock data, as well as reflecting change in
method of data.

In the processing of making all the adjustments above,

I fould that "other" assets did not exactly equal

11

other 11 liabilities,

usually being larger, and that the financial sector consistently had an
"others" liabilities position while spending units had an "others" as
an indirect security (issued by the financial system and owned by spend
ing units), to reduce the asset total to the smaller liability estimate,
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and to distribut e it among spending sectors in proportio n to their initial
relative shares of

11

others 11 assets.

This seems preferabl e to leaving out

the "others" category altogethe r, though it does seem to distort govern
ment sector indirect asset holdings substanti ally.
In summary, the flow of funds data are some-what incomplet e for my
purposes.

Indirect claims among financial intermed iaries remain on a

less than fully gross basis.

The personal sector is insuffici ently homo

genous, and needs to be further disaggreg ated.

Direct financial flows

within the personal sector are not estimated , so it is impossibl e to ob
tain a quantitat ive picture of the unorganiz ed financial market.

Deposits

of individua ls -with employer corporate enterpris es are included among
"others" for both; this is a small but not insignifi cant item.

Corporate

and unincorpo rated business holdings of time deposits and hence amount
of loans are overestim ated because of financial institutio n requireme nts
of compensat ory deposit balances.

There are other

minor problems:

securitie s companies are included in the corporate rather than financial
sector because of lack of data for the early years; and the economic mean
ing of the "others" items for financial analysis is unclear, though prob
ably unimporta nt.

